



Upjohn Institute Press 
 
 
Rethinking the Social 
Security Disability 
Programs: 







Jane L. Ross 













Chapter 11-rethink (pp. 343-349) in: 
The Economics of the Great Depression 
Mark Wheeler, ed. 
Kalamazoo, MI: W.E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research, 1998 
DOI: 10.17848/9780880995665.ch11-rethink 
 
Copyright ©1998. W.E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research. All rights reserved. 
Rethinking the Social Security
Disability Programs: Causes
and Options
Jane L. Ross 
General Accounting Office
The Social Security Disability Insurance (DI) and Supplemental 
Security Income (SSI) programs have been experiencing substantial 
stress as a consequence of rapid growth in the number of program ben 
eficiaries. 1 Several operational problems have also contributed to pro 
gram stress. For example, the media have spotlighted several examples 
of program abuse and inadequate management action, and policy ana 
lysts have criticized the inefficiency of the disability eligibility deter 
mination process as well as the lack of attention to assisting 
beneficiaries in returning to gainful employment. Faced with this broad 
range of problems and the increased scrutiny focused on these pro 
grams, policymakers and the public seem to be open to considering 
program changes.
At the same time, changes have occurred in the way society views 
people with physical and mental impairments—changes that are lead 
ing to a rethinking of the relationship between cash benefit programs, 
such as DI and SSI, and the ability of people with significant impair 
ments to engage in productive work.
These comments address some of the operational problems within 
the DI and SSI programs and some of the societal changes that, in 
combination, are resulting in a receptiveness to rethinking the purpose 
and design of these programs. The comments also summarize some of 




Both DI and SSI currently have significant backlogs of cases await 
ing decisions on eligibility. In particular, waiting time for those who 
are appealing denials of their initial application now averages about a 
year.
As the Social Security Administration (SSA) has struggled to pro 
cess the tremendous number of applications for benefits, it has for 
many years reduced the number of reviews of the disability status of 
people already receiving benefits. Since the same workers are responsi 
ble for initial determinations and these periodic reviews, SSA has had 
to prioritize workloads and has done so by limiting its reviews of con 
tinuing disability status. 2
The net result of the eligibility determination backlogs and limited 
review of continuing eligibility is that SSA has been giving poor ser 
vice to its applicants and neglecting its responsibility for maintaining 
program integrity.
A second operational problem involves Administrative Law Judges 
(ALJs), who hear the appeals of applications that have been denied. 
The ALJs are reversing decisions denied at the initial level in about 70 
percent of the cases that they hear. This reversal rate is much higher 
than it has been in years past and reflects the lack of a consistent sys- 
temwide process for determining eligibility. Adverse publicity about 
SSI program abuse by drug addicts and alcoholics, the parents of some 
disabled children, prisoners, and immigrants also signals that program 
managers have not been sufficiently vigilant in determining eligibility 
for benefits or monitoring people once they begin receiving benefits.
Finally, neither the DI nor the SSI program has a good record of 
returning beneficiaries to work. While no one is certain what propor 
tion of the beneficiary population can be expected to work, currently 
about 1 in 500 DI beneficiaries leaves the benefit rolls to return to 
work—a number that is generally agreed to be too low.
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SOCIETAL CHANGES
Society's view of the right of people with physical and mental 
impairments to be accommodated in the work place has changed sig 
nificantly. The public appears to believe that people with impairments 
ought to be assisted in a variety of ways to lead economically produc 
tive lives. More and more, we are coming to believe that categorizing 
people as either disabled or not disabled can't be done accurately. 
Rather, disabled people have a broad range of impairments with vary 
ing levels of severity. Many can be assisted to increase their involve 
ment with the workplace through adaptive technology and medical 
advancements.
There is also greater appreciation that the link between medical 
impairments and ability to work is a weak one. Several studies suggest 
that medical criteria by themselves are poor predictors of work poten 
tial, and many people who meet the DI and SSI eligibility criteria cur 
rently are working.
Society in general also seems to think that people ought to work. 
This view suggests not only that people ought to work if they are better 
off financially when working than when not working, but that most 
people have a responsibility to work. We have seen this view come to 
the fore in the new welfare legislation that limits the amount of time 
individuals can draw benefits. Such proposals are framed in terms of 
numbers of years of receiving benefits, not in terms of income avail 
able to the family. This same view is now being articulated with respect 
to disabled people in proposals that would limit the amount of time that 
they can receive DI and SSI benefits.
There is also a general concern about the overall size of the govern 
ment sector and whether programs such as DI and SSI are including 
larger numbers of people than is appropriate. In the case of the DI pro 
gram, some people are also concerned that taxes used to fund DI bene 
fits reduce the revenue that realistically can be raised for the retirement 
and survivors' insurance programs.
These shifts in the way decision makers and the public think about 
people with disabilities and about the size of the disability programs 
have generated a great deal of discussion about how to ensure that
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everyone who can work is assisted in doing so, while still ensuring 
income support for those who are unable to work.
POLICY OPTIONS
The policy options currently being discussed can be described as fit 
ting into one of three categories: incremental changes that modify spe 
cific provisions to encourage work, leaving the structure of the DI and 
SSI programs intact; changes that alter the current terms under which 
benefits are received, such as imposing time limits for certain benefi 
ciaries, but leave the current eligibility definitions in place; and 
changes that fundamentally redefine program eligibility and the benefit 
structure.
Regardless of whether incremental or more fundamental change 
might occur, most participants in discussions about DI and SSI policy 
changes agree that two actions currently under way at SSA must go 
forward. The first and most ambitious of these is the disability redesign 
project, the goal of which is to make the disability determination pro 
cess more timely, consistent, and cost-effective. This effort includes 
initiatives designed to reduce the time involved in making determina 
tions to standardize the ways in which disability is evaluated at all lev 
els of decision making, and to change the standards by which disability 
is evaluated toward measuring one's ability to function in the work 
place. Second, there also appears to be general agreement that SSA 
should increase the number of reviews of continuing eligibility that it 
performs, so that individuals with some likelihood of medical recovery 
will be reviewed on a regular basis.
INCREMENTAL CHANGES
The main thrust of most incremental reforms is to increase the total 
income and benefits of current beneficiaries who attempt to work. One 
such measure would increase the amount that a beneficiary could earn 
while still receiving benefits. Currently, most beneficiaries become
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ineligible to receive benefits when they earn more than $500 a month 
for nine months.
Another proposal suggests reducing cash benefits gradually as earn 
ings increase over time, rather than terminating benefits abruptly after 
a certain time at work or after a certain earnings level has been 
achieved, as is currently the case. (This proposal is targeted primarily 
at DI, since SSI already has this more gradual benefit offset.)
A third suggestion is that beneficiaries who return to work be 
allowed to retain their Medicare or Medicaid eligibility for much 
longer periods than provided in current law. The fear of losing medical 
coverage may be the most powerful barrier facing beneficiaries who 
consider attempting to work.
Others have suggested a different type of work incentive—a tax 
credit that functions as an earnings supplement for beneficiaries who 
work. A credit would be designed to ensure that an individual's com 
bined income from earnings and the tax credit would be sufficient to 
encourage him or her to try to work and then to stay at work.
A final example of incremental change is a proposal to allow SSA to 
use private rehabilitation firms to help beneficiaries develop skills that 
will facilitate their return to work. Currently, almost all vocational 
rehabilitation financed by SSA is conducted by state agencies. Many 
people believe that expanding the capacity of rehabilitation services 
and introducing competition among providers would be more effective 
in returning beneficiaries to productive activity.
INCREMENTAL PLUS
Some participants in the current policy discussions are concerned 
that the incremental options listed above will not provide enough 
encouragement for current beneficiaries to attempt to work. They 
believe that younger beneficiaries or those with certain impairments 
should receive benefits only for a limited number of years, so that they 
will have very strong incentives to try to work. Time-limited or tempo 
rary benefits could be proposed in conjunction with several of the 
incremental options.
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Another more substantial change to encourage more attempts to 
return to work would be to provide vocational rehabilitation services to 
people who have not yet been determined to be eligible for benefits. 
This approach has been suggested by those who believe that rehabilita 
tion would be much more successful if it were provided well before the 
time an individual is determined to be eligible for benefits.
FUNDAMENTAL CHANGE
This category of suggested policy changes involves a fundamental 
reorientation of the DI and SSI programs, with a shift in focus from 
proving an individual's inability to work to enhancing and supporting 
an individual's ability to work. The programs might run on two tracks. 
One track would be reserved for those whose disabilities represent 
much more profound functional limitations than the current DI and SSI 
definitions. These individuals would be evaluated as the most unlikely 
to return to work. The second track would be for those with some 
remaining capacity to function in the workplace, but a level roughly the 
same as the current DI and SSI definition of disability. The program 
rules for this group would be quite different from those that exist today 
and would allow for long-term receipt of both benefits and earnings. 
The idea would be to encourage as much work as possible and allow 
benefits to serve as a supplement. The underlying rationale for seg 
menting the program in this way would be to separate the conflicting 
goals in the current system, providing full benefits as long as an indi 
vidual couldn't work while providing significant encouragement and 
incentives to work.
CONCLUSION
The DI and SSI programs are being criticized because of operational 
failings and because they appear to undercut the beliefs that people 
with severe impairments ought to have more opportunity to work and 
that cash benefits should be viewed as a last option. Policymakers and
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the public appear willing to consider changes in the DI and SSI pro 
grams to address both of these types of problems. Many ideas for oper 
ational changes are incorporated in SSA's disability redesign initiative, 
but its focus does not extend to assisting and encouraging beneficiaries 
to return to work. Proposals to encourage return to work range from 
changes in the amounts that individuals can earn and still retain eligi 
bility for benefits to restructuring the programs so that some individu 
als receive both benefits and earnings while those who are unable to 
work continue to receive cash benefits.
Those who support more fundamental reforms acknowledge that 
they don't know what proportion of the DI and SSI populations can be 
expected to work. Even if there is a shift in attitude toward much 
greater emphasis on work, the DI and SSI definition of disability is 
very strict, and most people receiving benefits have severe mental and 
physical impairments. Supporters of these fundamental reforms point 
out, however, that those who apply for benefits under new program 
rules may be more open to the possibility of change than those who are 
currently receiving benefits and who may not be able to adjust to these 
new expectations.
Common to all of these proposals is the recognition that the charac 
teristics of people receiving benefits are changing as are the societal 
norms about the programs and their beneficiaries. In order to restore 
wide public support, DI and SSI will need to response to these new 
realities.
Notes
1. These comments were revised in September 1996 to reflect recent developments 
in legislative provisions and in program growth.
2. In 1996, the Contract with America Advancement Act authorized over $4 billion 
in separate funding for reviews of disability status in fiscal years 1996 through 
2002. In addition, the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconcilia 
tion Act authorized an additional $250 million total in fiscal years 1997 and 1998 
for SSI reviews. These additional funds, as appropriated, will allow SSA to do 
more disability status reviews without shifting resources away from competing 
priorities.
